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This study looks into the ways in which the Supplemental Irrigation with Brackish Water 
in Syria project influenced policy and policy makers in Syria.  Amongst Syrian farmers, 
the practice of irrigation with brackish water is on the increase as rural wells are 
becoming increasingly saline.  The trend is disturbing, as unchecked use of saline water 
by farmers for irrigating their fields increases salinity of soils, which in turn reduces 
agricultural productivity.  Given the dependence of the Syrian economy on agriculture, 
these trends represent threats to national aspirations of economic growth.  The focus of 
the project was to investigate the parameters within which Syrian farmers can safely use 
saline water to irrigate their crops. The project also had a wider relevance to the region: 
if safe parameters could be discovered, then the use brackish water to supplement 
irrigation could come to be seen as a “bridging strategy” - in other words - the use of 
saline water to meet some of the agricultural demand for water could come to be seen 
as a viable way of decreasing strain on increasingly scarce freshwater resources.   
 
Main events of the project and the context in which it took place 
The project took place in a very challenging context for influencing policy. Within the 
quasi-socialist state of Syria, the government centrally controls all aspects of the 
economy and the processes behind the formulation of particular policies are neither 
public nor transparent. Policies addressing water issues fall between competing 
interests, and pressures are exerted from different directions.  Among these are national 
aspirations for economic transformation, the recognized need to protect fragile natural 
resources, and disputes between countries in the region over existing water supplies.   
 
As for the institutional context, the project took place as a collaborative effort between 
ICARDA, the University of Aleppo, and the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Reform (MAAR).  Due to low levels of research utilization and the highly circumscribed 
role that research plays within the Ministry, the role of research in shaping the decisions 
is limited.  Interviewees described how research, if it is to be considered at all by policy 
makers, must fall within the parameters laid out by the overall national strategy.  The 
policy regime of the MAAR is a “routine decision-making regime” in which research 
addresses technical parameters such as identifying packages of technologies, levels of 
fertilizers, recommended seed varieties, etc.  Policy and decision-makers generally are 
not receptive to research that suggests changes to policy itself.    
 
Ways in which the project influenced policy  
The greatest influences of the project fell into Lindquist’s categories of expanding policy 
capacities and in broadening policy horizons.  It expanded policy capacities through 
supporting young Syrian researchers to look into and elaborate the technical parameters 
of utilizing saline water to irrigate crops.  Several students supported under the project 
are now working within the Ministries of Agriculture (MAAR) and Irrigation (MOI), and the 
knowledge and experience that they gained is being put to use in their current positions.  
Other students are working within the university as teaching assistants and, along with 
the professors who were supervised the research, the findings from the project are being 
used as teaching examples in course work.   
 
The project broadened policy horizons by broaching a new way of looking at the problem 
of saline water.  In the time that elapsed after the project, the topic has proven to be 
highly relevant in the region.  Evidence of the relevance of this topic can be seen in the 
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subsequent creation of the International Centre for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA), a 
research organization dedicated to investigating issues of farming under saline 
conditions.  Furthermore, ICARDA has continued the work that was begun in this project 
by creating a continuous research program on the use of low quality water, of which the 
use of saline water is an important component.   
 
Finally, project participants also reported that findings from research results from project 
provided the impetus to create regulations around the use of drainage water for irrigation 
- thus constituting one instance in which the project may have affected policy regimes. 
 
 
Factors Facilitating and Inhibiting Policy Influence 
 
Factors outside of the control of the project 
One of the main factors contributing to the influence of this project is that its main thrust 
(increasing the efficiency of agricultural water use) falls within the broad priorities of the 
Syrian government.  What the project was unable to influence was the primary way in 
which the government approaches increasing water efficiency, which is through the 
promotion of more efficient sprinkler and drip irrigation technologies. A factor facilitating 
the influence of the brackish water project was the involvement of Dr. Noureddin Mona 
who was appointed to Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform after the closure of 
the project.  Although his promotion that had nothing to do with the brackish water 
project, it has contributed to the influence in several ways.  First, Dr. Mona’s involvement 
in the project provided him exposure to issues surrounding the use of saline water in 
irrigation and he is well versed in the topic, which may render him more receptive to 
research.  Secondly, Dr. Mona’s promotion has brought other changes to the Ministry, 
which in a more general way, has had a wider influence on the policy regime within the 
ministry.  With his promotion, Dr. Mona has been making institutional reforms to elevate 
the stature of research within the Ministry.  He has also brought researchers into key 
positions in order to increase the ministry’s capacity to take research into account in 
decision-making.  An important aspect of this is that, with their new appointments, the 
incoming researcher-officials bring their experience and knowledge networks with them, 
with the result that new ideas are in circulation around the MAAR.   According to the 
comments made by Dr. Oweis, and corroborated by interviews with policy makers, the 
topic of irrigation with saline water is now a problem that highly placed policy makers 
within the MAAR are familiar and this project was a significant contributing factor to that. 
As research about how to safely use brackish water is elaborated, there are now 
intellectually receptive audiences for this new knowledge within the ministry. 
 
Another inhibiting factor, mentioned above, was the institutional context in which this 
project took place, and the circumscribed role that research plays, and which inhibits its 
influence.   
 
Factors within the control of the project 
Several design features of this project contributed to its influence.  Particularly critical 
was the involvement and stability of ICARDA.  With its high research capacity, strong 
reputation, and closely articulated relationship with the Syrian national research system, 
ICARDA’s involvement was certainly one of the most important aspects of this project.  It 
almost certainly provided a legitimacy to the research that might not otherwise be 
available.  In terms of managing the project, ICARDA provided a stable and reliable 
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platform in terms of provision of resources, facilities and logistical support.  Without 
ICARDA’s presence, it almost certainly would not have been possible to go ahead with 
the project at all.  Secondly, the stability of the staff and the research programs at 
ICARDA provided storage capacity for the research results to be retained after the 
project closed, and a place from which those results could be carried forward into 
subsequent work.  
 
Another strong feature of the project was the way in which it bridged research and policy 
worlds through its participants.  The project deliberately brought individuals that were 
both researchers and decision-makers into its orbit.  One example of this was the 
inclusion of Borhan Kasmo, whose PhD research was supported by the project, but is 
also an official within the Ministry of Irrigation.  Also, the advisory committee included 
senior researchers and officials from the university and from government research 
stations.   
 
What most hindered the projects’ ability to realize greater influence were poor 
management and coordination.  The project coordinator was unable to synthesize and 
present the findings of the project as a coherent whole, which has, in turn, severely 
limited the utility and communicability of the results.  Another aspect of this relates to the 
opportunities that were missed in building research capacity at the University of Aleppo.  
ICARDA is a research institution with advanced research facilities and attracts 
experienced, international researchers.  In comparison, the institutional capacity at the 
University of Aleppo is very low.  It has very little in the way of research facilities and has 
a poorly paid staff that is frequently turning over.   While there are challenges and risks 
presented by working with institutions of low capacity such as the University of Aleppo, 
the involvement of ICARDA could have presented an opportunity to increase those 
capacities by providing the opportunity for staff and students to do some highly relevant, 
ground-breaking research with the support of ICARDA’s world class resources.  Had the 
project made appropriate provisions for closer coordination and more effective 
management, the interaction could and should have been an extremely positive one.   
Despite such potential, there remains amongst the participants some lingering 
disappointment and frustration about the inability to capitalize on the formative work that 
it produced.  This is an unfortunate ending for a project that appears to have had so 
much potential in an exciting new area. 
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This study examines the linkages between research and policy in IDRC project 060001, 
entitled Supplemental Irrigation with Brackish Water in Syria.  This study is one of 25 cases 
prepared for IDRC’s Evaluation Unit as part of a large strategic evaluation1 into the influence that 
IDRC-supported research has had on policy.  The purpose of the case studies is to systematically 
document IDRC experiences in supporting research that influences policy.  Through cross-case 
analyses and engaging IDRC staff in examining the cases, the overall study intends to help staff 
and partners learn about what works, and improve the overall effectiveness of IDRC-supported 
work that includes policy influence amongst its goals.  The overall study is guided by three key 
questions:  
1. What constitutes public policy influence in the IDRC experience? 
2. To what degrees, and in what ways, has IDRC supported research/projects influenced 
public policy? 
3. What factors and conditions have facilitated or inhibited the public policy influence 
potential of the IDRC supported research? 
 
Shortage of water is a particularly serous problem in the MENA region, which is one of the 
driest areas of the world.  One thousand cubic meters per capita per year (cu m/capita/year) is a 
benchmark used by the World Bank as an indicator of serious water scarcity.  The World Bank 
estimates that in 1999, the average availability of water in the MENA region was 1,200 cu 
m/capita/year.  This is close to the WB 1,000 cu m/capita/year benchmark, and to make matters 
worse, this is part of a sharply decreasing 
trend, projected to reach 500 cu 
m/capita/year by 2025 (see Box 1). The 
situation in Syria is more urgent than 
regional averages.  Currently, water 
availability is estimated to be 432 cu m/ 
capita/year, far below the WB benchmark, 
and is projected to reach 160 cu m/capita/ 
year by 2025 (Oxford Business Group, 
2002).   
This project is one of four selected 
cases of IDRC-supported research in the 
area of Water Demand Management 
(WDM) in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region.  It was selected as a case 
study because of its policy intentions and 
Box 1.  Water Availability in MENA: 




Figures from World Bank, 2002 
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because of its topical focus on WDM management.  Historically, IDRC’s support for research on 
water has been of a different character than most of the large international development donors.  
While the mainstream donors have tended to support large projects increasing water supply, such 
as building of dams, locating and exploiting new groundwater resources, and building water 
desalinization plants to convert seawater into potable water, IDRC’s support has always tended to 
focus more on the local level.  IDRC’s early work on water was similar to other donors in that it 
focused on increasing water supply, but rather than focusing attention on large centralized water 
supply systems, IDRC’s technical support has been on smaller-scale, decentralized systems at 
the local level, such as roof collection systems and other simple, low-cost technologies.  Over the 
years, IDRC-supported has gradually shifted away from technical aspects of supply management 
towards investigations into socio-economic and behavioural aspects water use (Brooks 2002). 
Recent IDRC experience in the MENA region indicates that many governments in the region 
as well as large bi- and multi-lateral donors are beginning to pay increasing attention to WDM.  
The inclusion of several Water Demand Management projects allows the study to understand 





2.1 The Research Problem:  Irrigation with Brackish Water 
The problem that the brackish water project undertook concerned the growing practice of 
using “brackish”, or saline, water to irrigate crops.  In Syria, this has come as a result of the 
increasing levels of salinity in groundwater, which, in turn, is a problem that is very much 
connected to changing agricultural practices.   
The main mechanism through which groundwater becomes salty is through the 
interaction of water and the soil.  In arid regions of the world, accumulation of salts in the upper 
horizon of the soil occurs as salts and minerals within soils are picked up and dissolved in the 
water. As water is drawn upwards through the soil and evaporates, crystallized salts are left at the 
surface at the interface between the land and air.  This is a normal process in the arid climactic 
conditions of Syria’s deserts and steppes, and under traditional Syrian crop rotations, in which the 
land is left to fallow for extended periods, the levels of salt in the topsoil stay at relatively low 
levels.  More recently, with increasing agricultural irrigation and more frequent crop rotations, 
increasing volumes of water are moving through the soil, and increasing salinity of soils. 
Compounding the problem is the widespread practice of flood irrigation.  This is an irrigation 
technique in which large volumes of water are pumped onto fields to the point that there are 
standing pools of water, and then the water percolates down into the soil.  In addition to being an 
extremely inefficient use of water, the water picks up accumulated salt at the soil surface and 
draws them down into the ground to mix with freshwater below.  The result is a net increase in the 
groundwater salinity, which finds its way into underground reservoirs and wells (Rached 
interview, November 21, 2002).   
It is estimated that 70-79% of Syrian farmers use flood irrigation, and that many continue 
to do so even when the water from their wells has become saline (Michel Wakil, January 14, 
2003; Hanon, 2001).  Hanon (2001), in a Master’s thesis supported by the brackish water project, 
describes that irrigation with brackish water has been an ongoing practice for the last 10 years of 
farmers in the Khabur basin, located in the arid northeastern Governorate of Hassakeh.  Hanon 
explains that along with the increasing salinity of groundwater, the expansion of cultivated land 
along with unchecked digging of wells for irrigation has significantly contributed to increasing 
salinity of the soil.  
The overall rationale behind the brackish water project was twofold.  First, given the large 
volumes of brackish groundwater, and its widespread use, the project would investigate the 
parameters within which saline water can be safely used – both in terms of protecting the 
environment as well as maintaining levels of productivity high enough to support farmers’ 
livelihoods. The problem also has a much wider relevance to the region.  If safe parameters could 
be discovered, the use of brackish water to supplement irrigation could come to be seen as a 
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“bridging strategy” (Brooks interview, September 25, 2002) – in other words, in areas of the world 
where freshwater is scarce, the use of saline water to meet some of the agricultural demand 
could come to be seen as a viable way of decreasing strain on increasingly scarce freshwater 
resources.   
 
2.2 Macro Context:  a brief background of Syria 
Syria is located in the Middle East, on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea.  
Turkey borders it to the north, Israel and Lebanon to the southwest, Jordan to the south, and Iraq 
to the east (see Map of Syria in Annex 1).  Like many of its Middle Eastern neighbours, Syria is a 
young, quickly growing, and primarily urban society.  Syria’s rate of population growth has 
averaged 2.7% per year over the past five years.  Nearly 77% of the population is under the age 
of 35, and more than 40% are under the age of 15 and seventy-five percent of the population 
lives in the country’s six largest cities, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Tartous 
(Economist, 2002, 2003). 
 
2.2.1 Power Structures 
Political power in Syria is heavily concentrated at the top, with the president. Although the 
Constitution was drawn up in 1930 and it gained independence from France in 1946, Syria’s 
current system of government came into being when Air Force lieutenant-General Hafez Al Asad 
ascended to the Presidency in the 1970 “corrective movement”.  President Hafez Al Asad died in 
July 2000, whereupon Bashar Al Asad succeeded his father as president.  
The regime of modern Syria has been described as a “presidential monarchy” 
(Hinnebusch, 1999; 2001) and has grown out of a history of colonialism, military repression and 
decades of political instability.  In the early days of Asad’s 1970 takeover, many expected the new 
administration to be as unstable as those that came previously, but Asad managed to remain 
firmly in control of the country for thirty years.  He did this by amending the Constitution to 
centralize state powers, consolidating control by balancing the interests of power brokers, and 
creating overlapping intelligence services and army units (Economist, 2003; see also Seale 
1988).  The president lies at the centre, the arbiter between power brokers, with no one seat of 
power provided the basis to independently mobilize against him. 
The regime is also known for its firm control of political expression.  The president and his  
political party maintain political stability through a mixture of populism and  control.  Political 
activities and popular organizations are closely monitored and only the activities officially 
sanctioned political parties are tolerated.  Most newspapers are government-owned, and all are 
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subject to censorship. Policy decisions are made at the top, and are not offered for public 
scrutiny.   
Although the final word on policy decisions rests at the top, there are three streams 
through which new ideas for policy directions are offered up for debate: the government through 
it’s appointed ministers; the Ba’th party and its executive; and the Legislature.  These streams all 
converge in the person of the president, who presides as the chief executive over all three.   
The executive body of the government is the Council of Ministers (cabinet), consisting of 
the Ministers of government departments, the Prime Minister, as well as Three Vice Presidents.  
The president appoints all of these officials. 
The 250-member legislature consists of elected representatives from the six officially 
recognized parties.  Commentators have described how  the legislative assembly  is increasingly 
becoming more of a legalistic formality than a forum for debate (inter alia, George 2003, 
Economist 2003); what was before a “fiery debating chamber before the Asad era is now a rubber 
stamp for the decisions of the political elite” (Economist 2003:10). Although Syria is unique 
among many of its neighbours in permitting members of multiple political parties to sit in the 
legislature, this is done mainly to serve populist aims. (ibid).  The State of Emergency (which has 
been in place for 30 years) gives the president the authority on matters of national security and 
when the legislature is in recess.  The Constitution also grants the president the power to dissolve 
the legislature.  Although the Constitution does not stipulate the conditions under which 
dissolution can occur, it does stipulate that the legislature cannot be dissolved twice for the same 
reason (Library of Congress, 1988).   
The Ba’th party is the real venue for political debate and its members dominate the 
legislature.  If the government and legislature are the structures where policies are approved and 
implemented, the Ba’th party provides the mortar that cements political ideology throughout 
Syria’s institutions – and its influence reaches right down to the local level. The party grew out of 
a leftist social movement of the 1940’s that consisted mostly of students and teachers.  It was a 
potent political vehicle for civil mobilization against the French colonial government, and inspired 
popular uprisings across Arab homeland against colonial occupation and repression.  In Syria, 
the party now functions to make sure that society remains in step with the political ideology of the 
regime. The party apparatus forms a parallel power structure to the administrative departments of 
the bureaucracy, advising officials at all political levels on implementation of policy.   
The party’s influence reaches into most of the country’s important institutional structures 
(Hinnebusch, 1988; 2001).  The party’s organization reaches right down to the village level.  Due 
to its influence on access to universities, jobs and promotions, the party manages to extend a 
powerful influence into broader society, shaping the political orientations of middle classes and 
social elites. The party has a long reach, and is especially influential at the village level, as party 
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membership opens the way to professional advancement by way of opening doors into jobs in the 
public sector.   
In the three decades of Asad’s administration, Syria received significant political, 
economic, and financial assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc2, and 
accordingly, the country’s style of governance shares some characteristics with soviet systems.  
The country runs under what itself describes as a “quasi-socialist” political system, in which the 
economy is centrally managed according to five-year plans.  With the passing of President Hafez, 
the “quasi-socialist” system remains, but President Bashar, originally trained as a medical doctor 
in the UK, has continued the cautious transition from the “command economy” towards a more 
liberalized economy that was set in motion by his father in the mid-1980’s. Some reform has 
indeed taken place, but change remains slower than was originally expected.  
 
2.2.3 The Role of Water and Agriculture in Syria’s Economy 
Agriculture is intimately interconnected with the national economy, natural environment, 
and rural society, and is a sector that is challenged with having to find a balance between many 
competing priorities.  Agriculture is Syria’s largest economic sector, and the second greatest 
contributor to the country’s GDP next to oil.  Agriculture is important not only with respect to what 
it produces directly, but also in its role in supplying raw materials to Syria’s manufacturing sector.  
Both directly and indirectly (in downstream processing and manufacturing), it is estimated that 
agriculture employs about 29% of the county’s labour force (Economist, 2002).   
Increasing agricultural production is central to national aspirations for economic 
transformation.  Syria’s climate renders 55% of its landmass as arid steppe.  There are relatively 
low levels of irrigation and only about one-third of Syria’s total landmass is cultivated (Someh 
interview, October 19 2002; Economist, 2002).  In order to increase agricultural production, it is 
necessary to increase the area of cultivated land, which would necessarily entail expanding 
irrigation. 
There is however a great deal of uncertainty over future water supplies.  One aspect of 
this is the significant variability from year to year in levels of precipitation, and in recent years, 
droughts have greatly reduced agricultural production.  Another source of uncertainty stems from 
difficulties of securing agreements with neighbouring countries over sharing surface water 
supplies.  Most significant for Syria is the need to secure agreements with Turkey and Iraq to 
share water of the Euphrates River. Rural wells are being pumped at rates faster than they are 
renewed, leading to declining ground water levels.  This appears to have been aggravated by the 
digging of unauthorized wells. IFAD (2001) reports that in 1999, 47% of all rural wells were 
reported to be illegal (IFAD 2001). 
 
 14 
With moves towards a more market-oriented economy have come gradual changes in the 
way that agriculture is regulated. Politically, the country is divided into 13 provinces, or 
“Governorates”.  In the past, production of all agricultural commodities was managed under a 
strict quota system, in which each Governorate was expected to meet production targets for all 
crops and deliver produce to the state-owned marketing monopolies.  A more recent development 
has been the creation of “Agricultural Settlement Zones” (ASZ) to serve the purposes of natural 
resource management planning.  These ASZs are based on levels of precipitation, and 
regulations are now in place to better match production of crops to appropriate climactic regimes. 
With these changes has come a very gradual recognition that government control is not a suitable 
substitute for motivation and profit incentives.  While in the past the government intervened in all 
aspects of agriculture, now it has relaxed comprehensive control – the exception being wheat and 
other “essential” crops that are used as inputs into the processing industry, such as olives, cotton, 
tobacco, and sugar beets (IFAD, 2001).   
Amongst these essential products, wheat and cotton appear to be the most important.  All 
Syrians interviewed for this case study were able to identify wheat and cotton as Syria’s two main 
“strategic” crops.  The production of wheat is supported to maintain Syria’s own food security.  
Cotton, on the other hand, is supported because it is Syria’s most important agricultural export, 
and is also a staple raw material for Syria’s manufacturing industry (Oweis, Maya, and Trabulsi, 
October 21, 2002).  It is estimated that 25% of Syria’s workforce is involved either directly in 
production of cotton or in its manufacture for the production of textiles (Economist, 2002).   
To maintain continued high production of essential agricultural products, the government 
intervenes both upstream and downstream of the farmers by 1) selling inputs such as fertilizers 
and seeds for specific crops to licensed farmers, and 2) buying all produce through state owned 
marketing boards.  Although current regulations are intended to make precipitation levels the 
major determinant in cropping patterns, IFAD (2001) reports that conflicting pressures to meet 
production targets set out by the national strategy introduces some inconsistency to the system.  
Maintaining high levels of production of key crops remains a major contributor to regulation and 
enforcement.   
The rules and incentives around cotton production provide an example of how such 
inconsistency affects farmers.  Cotton is a summer crop that requires large amounts of water and 
the government has banned its cultivation in drier areas. Due to the presence of government-
guaranteed prices, cotton growing is a practice encouraged through positive incentives.  Thus, 
farmers’ choices are shaped by a two-part incentive structure:  on one hand there is the positive 
incentive to growing cotton due to guaranteed prices; on the other hand the punitive measures for 
going against the ban acts as a negative incentive for farmers in dry areas. 
These incentives can come into conflict, as illustrated by a story that I was told in Syria. 
The government’s enforcement of this ban is reported to have been inconsistent. According to the 
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story, when the ban first came into being, informal channels quickly appeared through which 
farmers in dry areas could sell illegally grown cotton to intermediaries.  Through these informal 
channels, cotton would eventually find its way to state-owned marketing boards.  Governorate 
officials were inclined to turn a blind eye to informal cotton markets because they helped ensure 
that their production targets were met.  Similarly, the resolve of the national government to get 
tough on the ban was softened due to the importance of cotton in downstream processing and 
manufacturing sectors.  With allowing these informal cotton markets in place, the two-part 
incentive structure breaks down, and farmers in dry areas live in an uncertain environment of 
conflicting incentives: on one hand, they feel the economic incentive to grow cotton because they 
can get away with it; on the other hand, they live under the shadow of the threat of punitive 
actions should enforcement change.  
And change it did.  The narrator of the story described that two years earlier, the Syrian 
government took a sudden firm stance on the ban. Punitive actions were undertaken, and Syrian 
authorities ordered hundreds of hectares of illegally grown cotton to be plowed underground, with 
there were serious economic consequences for farmers.3   
The teller of the story could offer no reasons behind the sudden change.  The story was 
told to me as a way of illustrating to me that it would be difficult to find evidence of research 
influencing policy in Syria; it was a way of illustrating the nature of Syrian policy application.  But 
the story has interesting implications for the larger policy study in that it offers an example of a 
kind of change in policy in which policies themselves have not changed, but rather that the priority 
in enforcing conflicting or competing policies has been altered.  Such changes do not affect 
individual policies themselves, but result in rather sudden changes in how farmers that fall under 
the shadow of the two competing policies experience them4.   
 
2.3 Intersection of Water Demand Management and Regional Politics  
When I asked Dr. Noureddin Mona, Syria’s Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, 
what IDRC could do to better support research into inform water demand management in Syria, 
he reacted to the language of “water demand”, and highlighted the connection between regional 
politics and the political importance of language around water management: 
You see, when we are talking about security of water, I see these as political issues.  We 
see what is happening in Lebanon with the Wazzani Dam, for example.  When you talk 
about water security, you have to be sensitive to these issues.  That is why in Syria, we 
are attempting to optimize the efficiency of water use. (interview, Dr. Noureddin Mona, 
October 22, 2002) 
 
Efficiency of water use was a frequently used phrase amongst the Syrians interviewed for 
this study, and all were able to identify the main conservation measures taken by the Syrian 
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government, which is to reduce the amount of water wasted in irrigation through the promotion 
new irrigation technologies through the provision of government-supported loans5.  
On examination, the MAAR’s focus on efficiency of water use is both practical and, as Dr. 
Mona’s comments indicate, politically important.  By framing water policy measures in terms of 
“efficiency”, one addresses the practical issue of making existing water supplies go further.  But 
the language of efficiency is also politically important in that it does not reduce the urgency of 
Syrian claims on regionally shared water supplies.  Increasing shortages of water throughout the 
MENA region has meant that there are high stakes attached to negotiations over water.  For 
Syria, internal policies to reduce water demand do not support strong positions for negotiating 
externally with neighbours.   Syria has many competitors for water, and the need to share the 
water of the Euphrates is a particularly sore spot in Syria’s relationship with Turkey and Iraq.6 It 
also figures into the volatile relationship between Syria and Israel, particularly in relation to 
Israel’s illegal occupation of the Golan Heights.  Water has also been a pivotal issue in Syria’s 
support of Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon in their respective disputes with Israel7.    In the 
complicated politics of the MENA region, water issues have managed to seep into and find 




3.1 Approach to Data Collection 
Data for this case study was collected from three sources: semi-structured interviews with 
key informants, project documents, and background literature concerning issues surrounding 
water and politics in the MENA region.  The project files for the project are housed in IDRC’s 
Middle East Regional Office (MERO) and were reviewed in Cairo prior to conducting interviews in 
Syria. Reviewing documents before conducting interviews was useful as it provided a basic 
overview of the key events of the project, as well as an orientation to the various roles of its 
participants.  Documents of particular relevance (such as technical reports and correspondence 
around pivotal moments in the project) were marked, photocopied by MERO staff, and sent to 
IDRC headquarters in Ottawa for closer examination during analysis and writing stages.  
Literature around water issues in the Syria and Middle East, both white and grey, was reviewed in 
order to put what was heard in the interviews in a broader economic and political context. 
A standard interview guide prepared by IDRC’s Evaluation Unit determined the approach 
interviews, and the generic questions that it provided were refined and adapted in order to make 
them relevant to the actors in the case.  A list of all interviews and meetings is provided in Annex 
2.  Key information about the project came primarily from those who were directly involved.  This 
included:  
• IDRC program officers (2) 
• The researchers from McGill (2)  
• ICARDA (1) 
• Professors and students at the University of Aleppo (5* professors and 4 students),  
• Current members of government who were involved in the project (2*).   
 
 
In addition to interviews of people who were directly involved in the project, valuable 
information came out of less formal interviews and conversations during the study period in Syria.  
Courtesy visits arranged with researchers and administrators at ICARDA, meetings with the 
Engineers at the Duma research station, provided valuable insights into the context in which the 
project took place, and the nature of the relationships between research centres and government 
departments. 
The main method for recording interviews was to take detailed notes. In some cases, this 
note taking was supplemented with the use of an audio tape recorder during the interview.  Tape 
recordings were not made in almost all the interviews conducted in Syria as it was felt that the 
presence of the tape recorder would compromise the candor of the interview.9   In other cases, 
information was unexpected and came during courtesy visits, or in unplanned conversations in 
                                                 
* Both of these include Dr. Noureddin Mona.  Although Dr. Mona was the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Reform at the time of the interview, during the project he was a professor of socio-economics at the 
University of Aleppo, and supervised one of the students whose research was supported by this project. 
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hallways or during car rides.  Although not recorded, these conversations were very informative 
and provided useful background information for interpreting data in the preparation of the case 
study.10   
Finally, there were four occasions in which information gathering occurred in meetings 
with several people.  This arrangement is less desirable than one-on-one interviews as it tends to 
limit the ability to focus on key themes or go deeper into the subjects thoughts, but it does offer 
the benefit of generating may points of view.  In any case, the group arrangement was 
unavoidable as all appointments were arranged by ICARDA into a tight program according to 
participants’ schedules, and there was no way of altering the arrangement once I arrived.   
3.2 Approach to the Analysis of Policy Influence 
The design of IDRC’s strategic evaluation implies an approach in which the project is 
taken as the starting point and the investigator works outwards to trace the outcomes and 
influences that project has helped to bring about.  Along the way, many different sorts of influence 
might be proposed, and it is then the job of the investigator to verify which of the possible ways 
are most likely.  In this study, verification was done primarily through comparison and 
triangulation of information sources.   
Lindquist’s three-part framework (2001) provided the three overarching categories of 
ways research projects can influence policy.  These categories form for the organizing the 
findings of this study.  The first of these categories is expanding policy capacities, and refers to 
outcomes such as improving the knowledge/data of certain actors; supporting recipients to 
develop innovative ideas; improving capabilities to communicate ideas; and developing new 
talent for research and analysis.  The second is broadening policy horizons, which includes 
outcomes such as providing opportunities for networking/learning within the jurisdiction or with 
colleagues elsewhere; introducing new concepts to frame debates, putting ideas on the agenda, 
or stimulating public debate; educating researchers and others who take up new positions with 
broader understanding of issues; and stimulating quiet dialogue among decision-makers.  The 
third category is affecting policy regimes, which refers to the modification of existing programs or 
policies, and/or the fundamental re-design of programs or policies.  When discussing the 
processes by which the project influenced policy, this study draws on both Neilson’s (2001) 
review of the literature on the influence of research on policy, and Lindquist’s (2001) analytical 
framework.   
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4.  OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT 
4.1 Research Products 
4.1.1 Intentions of influencing policy within the project 
None of the project's stated objectives explicitly expressed that policy outcomes were 
expected to flow from the project. Policy influence may be implied in activities described in its 
stated general objective, (i.e., "the formulation of long-term management strategies for the 
suitable use of brackish water in supplemental irrigation of field crops in the dry areas of Syria"), 
as well as in objective 'f', which states that the activities were planned to disseminate findings to 
Box 2.  Project Goals and Objectives 
 
Project Goal: 
The introduction of management technologies for the sustainable utilization of 
brackish water in supplemental irrigation of field crops in the dry areas of Syria, with 
special emphasis on wheat. 
 
General Objective: 
Initiate research activities and enhance capacity building for the formulation of long 
term management strategies.  These new strategies will be directed to the practice of 




a. To enhance research capacity on the sustainable management of irrigation with 
brackish water in the arid and semi-arid regions of Syria. 
 
b. To initiate experimental research field trials and modeling schemes to 
delineate strategies for the use of brackish water for supplemental irrigation. 
 
c. To understand socio-economic and technical constraints as they relate to 
irrigation practices and alternative management techniques. 
 
d. To calibrate and validate an existing salt and water movement model for the 
Syrian conditions. 
 
e. To formulate a long-term research strategy and action plan for the management 
of brackish water supplemental irrigation. 
 
f. To disseminate project findings to researchers, extensionists, and decision-
makers. 
 
(From Project Proposal, December 1996) 
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researchers, extensionists and decision-makers. 
 
Although the project's stated objectives are vague in relation to how the project intended 
to influence policy, the interest on IDRC's part to influence policy was well understood by the 
project's four central actors, Drs. Oweis (ICARDA), Wakil and Bonnell (McGill University) and 
Rached (IDRC).  The main mechanisms of doing so involved the creation of the steering 
committee including representation from both the MAAR and MoI, and holding a dissemination 
workshop at the end of the project, to which representatives from the Ministries, local media, 




4.1.2 Description of Research Outputs 
The primary outputs of the project are six Masters theses, one PhD dissertation (which as 
of October 2002 was still in progress and not yet complete), and a Final Technical Report.  When 
the project closed, the students' theses - the main outputs of the study - had not yet been 
completed, although preliminary findings of their studies had been published in the University of 
Aleppo newsletter. One article appeared under the authorship of Hagi-Bishow and Bonnell 
(2000), both of whom are Canadian researchers from McGill, had been published in a peer-
reviewed journal.  Hagi-Bishow was a PhD student under the supervision of Dr. Bonnell, whose 
research involved the use of a computer-based model to predict salt-soil interactions.  The article 
reported predictions made by the model using data gathered in the brackish water project.  All of 
these early materials were presented at the project's final dissemination workshop, including a 
demonstration of the modeling software by the Canadian PhD student.  A copy of the modeling 
program was left with the researchers in Syria, but it was not possible to discover what 
subsequent use, if any, was made of it.   
The research was heavily skewed towards the technical aspects of irrigating with brackish 
water - even though the proposal indicated that the project would look at both the socio-economic 
as well as technical issues surrounding the irrigation with saline water.  Except for one of the 
Master's thesis, all of the student research supported by the study was directed at quantifying and 
examining the interactions between the biophysical variables.  Thesis titles were:  
• Socio-economic study of Supplemental Irrigation using Brackish Water in Aleppo and Al-
khabour basin Al-Hassakeh, in Syria for the seasons, 1997/98, 1998/99 (by Ieman Abdel 
Rszak Hanon); 
• The effect of salinity and Rotations on Durum Wheat Yield (by Aziza Al-Atia);  
• The effect of Different Levels of Saline irrigation on Durum and Bread Wheat Production (by 
Hamida Zibdieh);  
• The effect of Seed Rate and Irrigation with Water of different Salinity on yield of hard wheat  
(by Amira Al Saleh); 
• Effect of Interactions of underground saline water, wheat species and plant density on 
productivity (by Ibrahim Al-Awad) 
 
Although explicitly requested by IDRC, and included in the final research proposal, no 
component of the project dealt with the costs and benefits of supplemental irrigation, and none 
considered the existing or potential policy environment surrounding the use of saline water. 
 
4.1.3 Consideration of Gender in the research 
Three of the students whose Master's theses were supported under this project were 
female, and several interviewees indicated that this represented a consideration of gendered 
perspectives in the project.  In reviewing the project's outputs, it is clear that gender is almost 
 
 22 
non-existent as an analytic category.  Gender does appear in the socio-economic study, which 
investigated the predominant and preferred farming and irrigation practices in two regions 
(Aleppo and Al Hassakeh).  The thesis contains a section describing women's preferences with 
regard to farming practices.  Although the thesis is noteworthy in that it is the only piece of the 
project that addressed gender at all, a significant shortcoming is that the findings about women's 
preferences are presented on their own, in isolation from the rest of its findings.  The thesis does 
not illustrate how or why women's preferences are different from men's preferences, how 
women's preferences are reflected in the farming practices that are predominantly employed, or 
any other sort of analysis of how women's preferences fit into and shape the surrounding 
context.11 
4.2 The Story of the Project 
4.2.1 Project Development  
IDRC's project database indicates that the project began on July 1, 1997, however the 
project files stretch back to almost two years prior to this.  Former IDRC Program Officer David 
Brooks recalls meeting Michel Wakil, who would later become the project coordinator and central 
figure in the project, at a conference early in 1995.  At the time, Dr. Wakil was a visiting professor 
at McGill University on leave from the University of Aleppo.  Brooks recalls that it was at this first 
meeting that they began to discuss the potential of using saline water for irrigation.  By 
September of 1995, Brooks received a proposal from both Michel Wakil and Dr. Robert Bonnell, 
both professors at McGill University (Brooks interview, Sept. 25, 2002). 
The project involved the collaborative efforts of three institutions: the University of 
Aleppo, ICARDA, and McGill University. The research was to be undertaken by the professors 
and graduate students (5 MSc and 1 PhD) working in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University 
of Aleppo - although, as noted by Dr. Bonnell, no researchers representing this institution were 
involved in the proposal process (Bonnell interview, Nov. 7, 2002).  ICARDA was to play a 
support role for the research, supplying the necessary inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and 
necessary requirements for the experiments.  Dr. Oweiss of ICARDA explained that he made 
sure that project documents clearly describe ICARDA's role in providing technical advice on 
designing experimental protocols, and to provide the students with use of ICARDA's research 
facilities in order to analyze their data (Oweiss interview, Oct 20, 2002).  The McGill researchers 
were to play a coordinative role, and would use their access to digital reference libraries to locate, 
access and supply relevant background literature to the researchers at the University of Aleppo.  
Dr. Bonnell and Dr. Wakil also provided technical support in the analysis of research results.  Dr. 
Wakil's was designated as the project coordinator, and the responsibility to synthesize the results 
and produce the final technical report for IDRC fell to him. 
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A number of policy-related issues arose throughout the design and development of the 
project, including the need for stronger policy orientation in the project and concerns about how 
the researchers would carry the results beyond research into policy. Another predominant 
concern was that there was an insufficient focus on the social, economic and policy dimensions of 
irrigation with saline water.   
Interviews revealed that some management and administrative concerns were also the 
source of considerable discussion during project development.  These concerns included: 
• The requirement for project leaders to secure parallel funding from other donors before 
IDRC could consider supporting subsequent stages of the project. 
• Whether or not the project could be effectively managed from Canada (Oweiss interview 
October 20, 2002; Rached interview, Nov. 21, 2002);  and 
• Whether or not the University of Aleppo had the existing capacity to undertake the work 
(Oweiss interview, October 20, 2002; Rached interview Nov. 21, 2002) 
 
4.2.2 Research Activities 
The research experiments took place in farmer fields, in El Hassakeh province. Some 
additional trials were run at the Directorate of Irrigation and Water Uses (DIWU) at their 
headquarters in Duma, which is under the supervision of Dr. Georges Someh, Director of DIWU 
and also a member of the advisory committee.   
The involvement of Syrian policy-making agencies occurred principally through the 
project advisory committee.  This body consisted of researchers working within research 
institutions within the orbit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian reform, as well as from the 
Ministry of Irrigation.  This group met annually to discuss research results, the progress of the 
project, and plans for experiments in the upcoming planting seasons. 
Logistical difficulties encountered in coordinating visits to the field sites caused delays in 
carrying out field research throughout the project. Most project participants attributed the 
difficulties to weak project coordination and the fact that the project budget was coordinated out of 
country. (Al Ahmed interview, October 20, 2002).   
 
4.2.3 Project Closure 
Due at least in part to the fact that parallel funding had not been attracted, a requirement 
for receiving subsequent IDRC support at the time, IDRC did not support a second phase of the 
project.  It is not entirely known what has happened with the research after the project's official 
closure.  Although the project was officially closed in 2000, the Masters theses were not 
completed until 2001, and the PhD dissertation is still not yet complete.  It appears that there was 
never a synthesis of all of the study findings. 
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The project ended with a final dissemination workshop.  All of the researchers were 
present, along with the steering committee, which comprised representatives from the two 
ministries.  Local media (television and newspapers) were invited and attended. At the final 
workshop, the students presented their preliminary findings, and Dr. Bonnell and Hagi-Bishow 
demonstrated the use of the computer model.   
It is difficult to assess the influence that the workshop may have had.  Michel Wakil, the 
professors at the University of Aleppo, and the students all reported that the workshop was a 
great success.  Robert Bonnell said that all in attendance "appeared impressed" with the findings. 
IDRC's Eglal Rached could not compare this workshop to others in IDRC experience, as she did 
not attend it.  Dr. Someh and Dr. Mona, both of whom are currently officials within the MAAR, had 
very little to say about the workshop, indicating perhaps that for them, it was not particularly 
memorable. 
Since the project's closure, more outputs and outcomes are evident:  the Masters theses 
that were supported have been completed and successfully defended. Project data has been 
used at conferences and the results and experiences of the Brackish Water project were valuable 
in the starting of a subsequent, larger project at ICARDA that is being funded by the European 
Union (EU), which focuses on screening new crop varieties for their tolerance to salinity.   
Despite the list of outputs, the overall contribution of the project's findings is debated 
amongst project participants. While some believe that the project met its overall scientific 
objectives, many researchers believe that with more time (and more data collected over multiple 
planting seasons), they could have yielded more significant results and gone further in reaching 
definitive conclusions. The researchers believe that the project did not provide sufficient time to 
generate statistically significant results. Moreover, while the data produced good preliminary 
findings, the researchers maintain that if some additional effort were put into synthesizing all of 
the individual project outputs, the findings could be presented in a much more concise and 
convincing form than they currently stand.  
Canadian partners at McGill view one of the most significant contributions of the project 
was the way in which it demonstrated to its Syrian counterparts a more participatory, inclusive 
way of doing agricultural research. The process of experimentation on farmers’ fields, as well as 
the presence of the project steering committee, were important ways of linking research results to 
both farmers and government extension services.   
In the end, because the separate research components and findings were never 
consolidated into a cohesive whole in the final report, or elsewhere, the extent to which project 
results can be utilized and built upon was definitely limited. It appears as though each of the 
students' work progressed along independent pathways, and although the quality of each of the 
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separate research outputs is reported to be quite high in quality, and the data robust, none of the 
project participants seem to know what all of findings represent together. 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING  
This section describes the institutional terrain on which the brackish water project took place, 
and helps to better understand the opportunity that this project had to influence policy.  Interviews 
of Canadian researchers indicate that Syria, for those unfamiliar with it, can be a very challenging 
place to work. In addition to language barriers, these researchers described Syria’s agricultural 
research system as being a complicated array of political and research institutions whose overall 
rationale is difficult to understand.  Former IDRC Program Officer David Brooks described the 
system as “opaque”, “difficult to understand” and that while he was in Syria, he was obliged to 
follow the lead of Dr. Eglal Rached, who has had considerable experience in Syria (Brooks 
interview, September 25, 2002).  Dr. Bonnell, had similar comments about his experiences.  Apart 
from the discussions about the technical aspects of the research, Bonnell reports always having 
“a difficult time understanding what was going on”, and like Brooks, also had to follow the lead of 
others (Dr. Robert Bonnell, interview: November 7, 2002). 
5.1 Research and policy in the MAAR 
The main players involved in agricultural water policies are the Ministry of Irrigation (MoI) 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR).  The policies they are involved in 
correspond generally to two levels: off-farm water management (MoI) and on-farm water 
management (MAAR).  The brackish water project that was conducted mainly in collaboration 
with the MAAR, but there were some links to the MoI – via Borhan Kasmo, and some officials 
were invited to the final dissemination workshop.   
As discussed in previous sections, in the past, the Syrian agriculture sector was 
completely regulated by the government.  Congruent with managed reforms to the economy at 
the national level along came the recognition that government control was not a suitable 
substitute for motivation and profit incentives.  Consequently, the MAAR has moved away from 
comprehensive control towards an “indicative planning approach”, in which research is used to 
generate the information that is used to provide guidance to farmers.  IFAD (2001) describes this 
role as doing the following: 
• Giving the general indicators for the production of major crops i.e. wheat, barley, 
cotton, sugar beet, tobacco and lentils, based on the national demand the technical 
suitability of each region or zone; 
• Determining, as recommended by agricultural research, the sustainable crop 
rotations and the product mix given land suitability and water availability; 
• Informing farmers of the optional dates of planting and harvesting for each area as 
per research recommendations; 
• Continuing timely provision of agricultural inputs; 
• Supporting extension services to disseminate appropriate messages to farmers, and;  




As part of the reforms, Dr. Mona has brought researchers into key roles within the 
ministry in a deliberate attempt to strengthen the use of research in policy (Mona interview, 
October 23, 2002). These developments have been seen as positive by researchers interviewed 
at both ICARDA and the University.  It is likely that this perception stems from the expectation 
that this will bring expanded research opportunities, as the reorganization of the research 
divisions and promotion of their colleagues has likely brought a number of them into closer orbit 
with the Ministry.   
At the time of my visit, efforts were well underway to better align and coordinate the 
research institutions within the MAAR.  In all, there are reportedly 130 government research 
stations across the country (Eng. Nidal Al Jouni, meeting October 19, 2002), and these are being 
brought into a hierarchy under the General Commission for Scientific Agricultural Research 
(GCSAR).  GCSAR’s mandate is to organize and consolidate research findings for policy 
purposes, and part of this is to reorganize research institutions under thematic areas according to 
different aspects of agricultural production.  There are research arms that focus on specific 
agricultural issues such as irrigation, forage crops, horticulture, cotton production, and animal 
production.   
 
5.1.1 Role of research in the MAAR 
Research and Extension are separate arms of the MAAR.  Research is the means 
through which new farming technologies and techniques are tested, and extension is the means 
by which those techniques and technologies are disseminated to farmers.  Although reforms are 
attempting to increase the role of research in policy, it appears that research remains regarded 
within the ministry as performing primarily an instrumental function of testing and choosing among 
technical options.   
Within all the research areas of the Ministry and the University that I visited, the research 
that I witnessed addressed only the technical side of agriculture, concerning things like seeding 
rates, crop rotations, irrigation systems, etc.  I saw no social research, nor any research that 
looked into agricultural policies. In the conversations that I had, the way researchers discussed 
their work evoked Weiss’ description of problem-solving meaning of use, in which research 
serves the purpose of providing solutions to technical problems.  Similarly, the most prevalent 
model of research within the Ministry conforms to the model that Weiss has termed research as 
data, where it is assumed that decision makers are technically sophisticated, they agree on 
values and goals, and decisions consist of choosing between several options that are sharply 
opposed (Neilson, 2001).  
It also appears that the lack of critical, socially relevant research is not supplemented 
from outside of the Ministry.  Researchers find their topics by examining the national strategy.  
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Ahmed Al Ahmed explained that even at the graduate level, the acceptance or refusal of all 
proposals for thesis topics of in the Faculty of Agriculture are determined according to the degree 
to which they adhere to the national strategy (Ahmed, interview October 20, 2002). 
The level of utilization of this research amongst policy and decision makers is almost 
certainly low.  Dr. Mona, Dr. Maya (at ICARDA) and Dr. Wakil report that a problem in Syria is 
that it is frequently the case that the technical reports generated by the Ministry’s research arms 
get shelved and go unread at higher levels.  Dr. Mona and Dr. Maya explained part of the 
problem in the system is the low level of technical capacity amongst many policy-makers.  Many 
current government officials received their training in the former Soviet Union, and particularly in 
disciplines such as economics and quantitative methods, they are badly equipped to deal with the 
problems of the new, market-oriented economy that have to grapple with now.  Decisions are 
reportedly often made without substantive knowledge of the problem at hand. (Maya, interview, 
October 2002). 
  Eglal Rached, whose experience with doing research in the region as well as in Syria 
stretches back over several years, describes the linkage between research and policy as being 
tight, but mostly because the majority of research is conducted within state institutions. She 
identifies the non-independence of research from politics in the region as a major limitation to 
research influencing policy.   
You have a number of research arms of the ministries. This is typical in the region - you 
have a research institute within the ministry of agriculture doing some experiments and 
also being involved in the formulation of policy.  Policies are centrally dictated; some of 
them may be very relevant, some are not that relevant, but this is the way policy is 
formulated (Rached interview, November 23, 2002). 
 
Dr. Mona and ICARDA’s Dr. Maya were happy to say that the reforms occurring within 
the Ministry are gradually changing this situation.  As described earlier, Dr. Mona has been 
attempting to recalibrate the system so that research will come to figure more prominently in 
decision-making, and Dr. Mona himself is a kind of official.  He received his PhD in Agricultural 
Economics at an American university, and worked as researcher and professional academic at 
the University Aleppo and ICARDA.  He has also brought researchers into key positions within 
the Ministry, and created committees of researchers to address key agricultural problems.  Within 
the Ministry, he is collecting all the graduate theses produced in the agricultural schools – 
gradually building the repository of research within the Ministry.  At both ICARDA and the 
University of Aleppo, the appointment of the new Minister is seen as a very welcome event.   
5.1.2 Collaboration in Research 
The most influential agricultural research organization in Syria is ICARDA.  As one of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGAIR) centers, its mandate is to 
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develop solutions for important agricultural commodities (in this case those suitable for production 
in arid agriculture) and to collaborate with national research systems for which there are 
complementary research divisions.  ICARDA works closely with the Syrian agricultural research 
system.  A major area of ICARDA’s work involves the development and diffusion of improved 
varieties of wheat, and this work coupled with the partnership between ICARDA and Syria’s 
national research system is seen to have been instrumental to the transition that Syria made from 
being a net importer of wheat to being a net exporter of wheat12 (Maya interview, October 20, 
2002).  
Interviews revealed that there is a fair amount of movement and collaboration between 
researchers at the Ministry, the University of Aleppo and ICARDA.  Dr. Ahmed Al Ahmed 
explained that joint University-Ministry research projects are developed to the mutual benefit of 
both the University and the government research institutions.  Partnerships with government 
research bodies provide badly needed research funding to Universities.  Such projects are also 
helpful to the Ministry in that universities provide both 1) additional capacity to address problems 
identified by the government, as well as 2) a way for government employees to earn advanced 
degrees.  As Dr. Ahmed Al Ahmed explains: 
[T]here are not enough researchers at the Ministries, and those that are there are mainly 
engineers, so [the Ministry] relies on Universities for degree training, as well as to do 
direct research (Ahmed interview, October, 2002). 
 
Such was the arrangement that brought Borhan Kasmo into the Brackish Water project.  
Borhan completed his MSc at the University of Aleppo, and currently works for General 
Organization for Land Development (GOLD) at the Ministry of Irrigation.  Once the Brackish 
Water project was approved, Dr. Ahmed Al Ahmed approached Borhan Kasmo to ask if he would 
like to continue doctoral studies under the project. 
ICARDA is an important link for researchers both within the government and at the 
University.  As an international research centre, ICARDA possesses advanced research facilities, 
and its researchers conduct world-class, internationally funded research.  For Syrian university 
researchers, finding linkages to ICARDA appears as a way to build a reputation and advance in 
one’s career.  Salaries of researchers working for ICARDA are much higher than those of 
professors, and it appears that working with ICARDA leads to connections and opportunities.  For 
example, prior to his appointment as Minister, Dr. Mona’s career was split between the University 
of Aleppo and ICARDA.  Dr. Ahmed, another well-respected researcher, also divides his time 
between the two organizations.  Dr. Wakil, prior to immigrating to Canada, also divided his time 
between the University of Aleppo and ICARDA. 
While there was not sufficient time to understand its dynamics and nature, it is apparent 
that a good deal of networking occurs amongst researchers located at the different organizations.  
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It is likely that this part of the reason that Dr. Mona’s promotion to Minister is seen as a welcome 
event at all of the institutions, as his appointment may be expected to open new opportunities for 
researchers who work in this context. 
 
5.1.3 Entry points for doing policy-relevant research  
Although the national strategy provides the topics that research will address, the policy 
directions that are set out in the national strategy are not open to negotiation or challenge.  It is 
also not possible for any bureaucrats to act on policy recommendations that may be contradictory 
to the national strategy.  Dr. Oweiss explains that the strategy of the researcher who wants to be 
useful for policy making is to direct research questions at issues that fall within the strategy, but 
for which there are not currently any answers: 
There is a lot of emphasis in Syria for policies for agriculture.  Influencing the policy 
comes as you find technologies or recommendations that responds to the needs of the 
decision-makers at the time when they want to formulate policies.  For example – you 
find that there is pollution because you find that people are using certain types of water.  
Now decision makers are looking for a solution – they want to make a policy on that.  
When you come up with that kind of recommendation then you can influence the 
decision-maker - when they need that recommendation.  So actually what you want to do 
is do work on issues that you feel the decision-makers don’t have answers to.  You look 
at that from the general strategy of the country (Oweis, interview, October 20, 2002).   
 
The researcher who wants to affect policy, however, must carefully choose entry points so that 
recommendations do not contradict the general strategy of the country, as contradictory 
proposals cannot be considered. 
The country has a strategy, for example, of subsidizing wheat production.  You don’t 
come with policies that contradict that.  You have to come to them in a way that will not 
contradict the strategy of the country. The country strategy is to keep wheat production 
high because it is a food security thing.  If you remove subsidies of wheat, then wheat 
production will reduce.  If you want to influence the policy, you work within the general 
strategy of the country. 
Now for example take water.  We want to reduce the water that is pumped so that we 
don’t have over-pumping.  But if you come and tell the country we want to put meters on 
the wells, they will not listen to you because meters cost lots of money and they don’t 
have it.  But you come with recommendations where you reduce the water pumping 
without contradicting the general strategies of the country.   
There are a lot of issues around policy that need to be taken into consideration when you 
make any recommendation.  These are very difficult things – they are not easy.  A lot of 
people come and say do pricing – but you cannot do it here.  Water pricing is not feasible 
in Syria at this stage.  So you have to come with another solution – solutions about 
increasing water efficiency on the farm without doing water pricing.  (Oweis, interview, 




While Oweis’ comments indicate there are constraints on the sort of policy questions that can 
be addressed by researchers, interviews with other researchers suggested that research that 
addresses itself to policy is unlikely to reach the policy makers.  Such questions are filtered out as 
results are passed up through the hierarchy of the Ministry.  The agricultural engineers at the 
irrigation research station described that they are instructed to only address technical issues in 
their research, and to send their results upwards through the system.  The director of the 
research division receives these results and then formulates his own recommendations to be sent 
on to higher levels.  Interviews consistently supported the idea that there is a clear distinction of 
roles: researchers provide information and data, and policy implications are an area of 
deliberation for policy makers.  Owing to these constraints, Dr. Oweis sees research as primarily 
useful for influencing farmers and thinks that IDRC should not expect every project to deliver 
policy outcomes.  He expressed that IDRC’s pushing for policy considerations to be included in all 
projects can in some cases actually limit what can be achieved: 
[IDRC] wants to make sure that [policy] is considered – that it is there.  They want to see 
some kind of impact in decision-making.  However sometimes I think they overdo it a bit.  
We do [research] not only to impact policy makers, but we do it to influence farmers.  
Sometimes farmers influence policy makers, but if we improve for example productivity – 
then the farmers can do it themselves.  Not everything requires policy changes, although 
we know policies are instrumental in making changes.  But to direct the research to serve 
policy-making only sometimes puts limitations on parts of the research.  If I direct a 
research proposal in which 70% were directed at farmers - not to decision-makers - then 
IDRC will look at it and say it will not fit.  Sometimes it needs to be balanced a bit (Dr. 
Theib Oweis, interview, October 20, 2002)  
 
5.2 ‘Gender’ in the MAAR 
Eglal Rached, in her October 2002 submission to IDRC’s Board of Governors, sums up 
the state of gender-sensitive research in the MENA region by stating that, “the shift from women 
to gender has not made significant progress in the Middle East” (p18).  Based on observations 
made for this case study, this statement accurately describes the state of gender-sensitivity in 
Syria’s Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.   
Although there were roughly equal numbers of men and women engineers at the 
research station that I visited, and although the Brackish Water project supported equal numbers 
of men and women MSc students, I met no women occupying senior positions in either the 
University of Aleppo or Syrian government institutions.  I also detected very little consideration of 
gender as an analytical category in any of the research that I saw, although to some extent, this 
might be expected, because for the most part I was interacting with researchers working on 
technical aspects of crop production.  When I asked about the gendered aspects of the research 
that the MAAR conducts, Dr. Mona was able to quote statistics that underlined the significance 
and value of work done by rural women in agriculture.  He also indicated that there is an 
institutional recognition of the importance of women’s roles in agriculture, citing the work of the 
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gender unit located in the extension arm of the Ministry as a concrete example of this, saying that 
this unit “plays a very good role in implementing income generating projects”.   
In its country program evaluation, IFAD (2001) provides some history of the development of 
the Gender unit within the MAAR.  It reports that gender attained a heightened profile with the 
creation of the Gender and Development (GAD) Unit in 2000.  Until recently, activities dealing 
with gender dealt primarily with subjects relating to women’s development, such as literacy, 
cooking, sewing, and some nutrition, but apart from vegetable gardening, agricultural production 
activities were not included. In January 2000, the unit moved out of the Extension arm of the 
Ministry and was reconstituted as a Gender and Development Unit, (GAD).  The new unit is 
responsible for mainstreaming gender in all projects and programs conducted by the MAAR, and 
its main objectives are:  
1. Gender sensitization and advocacy among decision makers and senior staff;  
2. Support for rural women to gain better access to resources, benefits, and decision 
making processes; and  
3. The improvement of women’s productive and entrepreneurial skills. 
 
Dr. Mona’s comments addressed the third objective, but my observations suggest that the 
work of the unit may not have attained the level of mainstreaming, as described by the first.  It 
appears as though capacity to mainstream is still needed and only a few opportunities within the 
ministry exist for researchers to consider gender dimensions in their research.  Indeed, when the 
word ”gender” came up in interview questions, project participants chose their words carefully. 
Elizabeth Bailey at ICARDA reports that gender-sensitization is a difficult task for ICARDA as 
well, as it is well-known amongst partners that “donors like gender”, and it is possible to alienate 
partners by pushing too hard.   
We have been gradually trying to introduce these ideas and concepts into the national 
system, but it is difficult and we must be careful in this.  Even explaining the terminology 
in Arabic is troublesome; there is a danger of being perceived as “women’s lib” (Bailey, 
interview October 20, 2002). 
 
Other interviews indicated that part of what may be hindering greater uptake of gender 
sensitive approaches to research in Syria and the Middle East might be a lack of understanding 
amongst donors and development practitioners about the unique character of “gender” in the 
region (Bailey, interview October 2002; Oweis, interview October 2002; and Rached, 2002).  This 
view emphasizes that there are strong cultural norms that are poorly understood by the wider 
development community. Oweis (interview, October 2002) suggests that part of the problem may 
be that much of what has been learned about gender in the development literature has come 
from sub-Saharan Africa, and does not apply to the very different social context of the Middle 
East. He feels that the lack of understanding centers mainly on the failure to fully appreciate that 
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Middle Eastern women’s roles in agriculture must be understood within the larger context of the 
agricultural family.  Both Oweis and Bailey emphasized that researchers must look beyond  
women’s roles in isolation.  
It is important to disaggregate by age and origin, not just gender.  Farms operate at the 
household level and you must look at the whole household framework.  Context is 
crucially important, and there is a danger that if you don’t look at the context, you can 
misperceive the situation. (Bailey interview, October 20 2002) 
 
Eglal Rached (2002) announced in her October 2002 submission to IDRC’s Board of 
Governors that the Middle Eastern Regional Office (MERO) in Cairo is planning to conduct a 
study into gender in the MENA region within the next two years.  Based on my observations on 
the state of gender-sensitivity of research in Syria and supplemented by feelings expressed by 
some interviewees that donor agencies tend to misperceive gender roles in Middle Eastern 
contexts, such a study appears to be timely and highly relevant. Such a study would help IDRC 
programs learn how to address these concerns.  It could also identify researchers and institutions 
where capacity in gender sensitive research can be build and expanded upon.  The recognition of 
the importance of women in agriculture by such diverse actors as the Minister of Agriculture and 
members of Syria’s research community (particularly at ICARDA), all suggest that there may be 
several locations within Syria from which culturally and regionally appropriate approaches to 




Earlier sections have described the context in which the brackish water project took 
place.  Section 2 described how water policies are inextricably linked to national interests, both 
domestic and regional, and how adopted positions are selected with care.  Section 5 described 
the research environment in which the brackish water project took place.  Within this 
environment, the most obvious limitation on research to influence policy stems from the 
circumscribed role of research in policy and decision-making.  Research fills the instrumental role 
of identifying technical parameters for implementing policies.  It is not critical of existing policies 
nor does it inform the creation of new policy.  In Lindquist’s (2001) terminology, the MAAR can be 
regarded as a primarily “routine” decision-making regime: research fills the role of identifying 
packages of technologies, levels of fertilizers, recommended seed varieties, etc., and policy and 
decision-makers generally are not receptive to research that suggests changes to policy itself.   
This section describes how the strongest influences of this project in expanding policy 
capacities and broadening policy horizons.  It also describes one example of how the project 
affected policy regimes, concerning the creation of a ban.   
 
6.1 Broadening Policy Horizons 
The project contributed to broadening policy horizons in two ways.  First, the project 
broke new ground by coming at the problem of saline groundwater from a new direction, and this 
theme has since been taken up and expanded upon by other researchers and research 
institutions.  Second, the project was successful in reframing the issues around irrigation with 
saline water for policy makers, promoting the view that saline groundwater is a resource that can 
be put to good use in agriculture, and is not just a threat to agricultural productivity.   
The project broke new ground by being a catalyst.  It initiated a body of work and helped 
ICARDA to get its feet wet in this new area of study.  Although the subject of saline water in 
irrigation is currently one component of a larger thematic area on the use of low quality water at 
ICARDA, at the time the project began, research on water was a brand new area at ICARDA.  Dr. 
Theib Oweis had only been recently hired in his post as Senior Water Specialist at ICARDA, and 
very little work had yet been done on the use of saline water, at ICARDA or anywhere else.   The 
relevance of the topic across the region has also become clear, as indicated by the recent 
creation of the International Center for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA) in Dubai, whose work is 
dedicated to this area.   
In addition to helping put the topic on the research map, the project reframed issues 
around irrigation with saline water for policy makers.  Interviewees felt certain that government 
officials are now aware about the potential use of brackish water.  Although he was not aware of 
any policies that have been made regarding brackish water specifically, Dr. Oweis stated that he 
 
 35 
is convinced Syrian policy makers now see brackish water as a valuable resource.  That both of 
the Ministry officials interviewed in this study were well aware of the problems and challenges 
associated with irrigation with saline water, one of them being the highest agriculture official in the 
country, there is a fairly good indication that decision-makers are receptive to receive and 
consider research about the use of saline water for irrigation.   
 
6.2 Expanding Policy Capacities 
Building capacities of new researchers was the strongest result area of this project.  The 
project allowed six students at the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Aleppo to earn 
Masters’ degrees, and one is continuing the work that was started in this project to complete a 
PhD – into a important area of research.   
Dr Mona described that this contribution is relevant to policy in that Syria lacks well-
trained researchers and extension professionals.  Projects such as this, that are designed to train 
new professionals and build research capacity, are very valuable to the Ministry.  That the project 
provided an opportunity to explore a new research area was also a significant aspect of the 
contribution of the project.  Borhan Kasmo, whose PhD research was supported under this 
project, is also the Head of the Department of Soil and Soil Pollution, a senior position within a 
research division of the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation.  From this position, he has some influence on 
directions that research within the Ministry takes.  The experience and knowledge gained in the 
area of saline water and its effect on soils is helpful to him in his professional role.   
Hamida Zibdieh, one of the Masters students supported by the project, is in a similar 
situation.  She is now working within the MAAR as an agricultural engineer, and the experience 
that she gained within the project is being brought to bear on problems related to salinity of water 
and soils in agriculture in her work at the Ministry.  The professors and other students, some of 
whom are now working at the University of Aleppo, are using the results of their research as 
examples in teaching, thus transferring knowledge to new agricultural professionals. 
 
6.3 Affecting Policy Regimes 
There was one instance of policy change reported, and this concerned the issuing of a 
decree forbidding irrigation drainage water on lands with heavy soils.  The creation of a decree 
has some formality, and the issue would have had to have been discussed within the legislature, 
been passed by its members, and agreed to by the President.   
The research that contributed to this decree was that done by Borhan Kasmo and was 
supported by the project.  Kasmo’s research examined rates of salt accumulation in soils in 
relation to a number of variables (heaviness of soil, concentration of salt in irrigation water, 
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leeching fractions etc).  As mentioned earlier, Kasmo is also Head of the Department of Soil at 
the General Organization for Land Development (GOLD)  - within the Ministry of irrigation. One of 
his most significant findings was that salt accumulation is most severe in heavier clay soils, and 
that accumulation of salts are worse when irrigating with water that has salt concentrations higher 
than 5 mMol. Kasmo reported that, as a result of presenting his findings at a conference with 
representatives from the Ministry of Irrigation, a decree was issued in the northeastern Al 
Hassakeh Governorate.  This ban forbid farmers from irrigating high clay content fields with 
drainage water, as the salt concentration in water draining off such fields can be quite high.   
This story of policy influence came up at a meeting with the students and professors at 
the University of Aleppo.  Dr. Ahmed Al Ahmed, who was also at the meeting, reported that 
compliance to such bans can be aggressively enforced.  The police may be called to deal with 
offenders; water pumps can be taken away, fines can be levied, or other punitive measures can 
be taken.  Unfortunately, no other interviewees could offer any insight the process or issues that 
contributed to the decision to create the ban, how it has been implemented and who is 
responsible for seeing that it is enforced.  
 
6.4 Other Proposed Influences on Policy 
The way in which the experiments were conducted in farmers’ fields and the subsequent 
adoption of techniques by farmers, were reported by the researchers at Aleppo University and at 
McGill University as important ways of disseminating the findings.  It was also proposed that 
these processes also influenced the way in which research is carried out at the University and the 
MAAR.  There is some consensus amongst interviewees that farmers adopted techniques and 
technologies as a result of being involved in experiments, but there is rather weak evidence that 
this outcome of the project had much influence on the way that research is conducted within the 
University or the MAAR. 
Drs. Wakil and Bonnell expressed that introducing the Syrian researchers and Ministry 
officials to research approaches that actually included farmers was an important component of 
the research project.  There were two ways in which they proposed that this influenced policy.  
The first had to do with the legitimization of more inclusive approaches to experimentation as an 
alternative to the more familiar approach of running highly controlled experiments at government 
research stations. The second was that through increasing the demand for technologies and 
techniques amongst farmers, there is greater receptivity in government extension services to 
undertake actions that facilitate their dissemination.  
Information collected from interviews tended to support the first part of the McGill 
researchers’ proposition, namely, that by conducting research on farmers’ fields, knowledge 
about farm practices that ameliorate the effects of irrigating with brackish water was transferred to 
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the farmers.  One example was provided by former student Hamida Zibdieh and Dr. Haleb Hodeb 
at University of Aleppo. These researchers reported that as a result of Zibdieh’s masters research 
into the relative salt tolerance of different varieties of wheat, farmers in the region came to know 
that the sham 6 variety of wheat was most salt tolerant.  The student and professor reported that 
as a result, sham 6 is now much higher in demand on the black market in the particular region in 
which the experiments took place.   Another instance in which research has been implemented is 
in the case of Amira Al Saleh, who was also a Masters student in this area but is now working 
within the MAAR.  The results of her work on the effect of seeding rates on yields have been 
adopted by Extension services for dissemination amongst farmers. 
No support was found for the second part of the McGilll researchers’ proposition: that 
government extension services provision of technologies and techniques has changed in 
response to changing demands from farmers. Recall that there were two parts to this proposed 
influence:  1) the project legitimized more participatory research techniques, and 2) that increased 
farmer demands for technologies have influenced changes at the policy level to facilitate farmers’ 
access to them.  In relation to the first, observations and interviews indicate that research on 
research stations is still very much the norm in Syria.  In relation to the second, it was not 
possible to confirm that new demands from changing farming practices are being met by 
government.  The example of the sham 6 variety of wheat shows that farmers must obtain useful 
seed varieties through the black market, suggesting that policies are allowing informal access to 
technologies that are in demand. On the other hand, it is possible that not enough time has 
passed for policies and regulations to adapt to the new situation. If demand in the black market 
persists over a long timeframe, it is plausible that signals will be received at the policy level, 
perhaps through the extension arm of the MAAR or the police, and salt tolerant seeds will be 
made more readily available. 
 
6.5 Factors Facilitating and Inhibiting influence on policy 
This section considers some of the things that facilitated and inhibited the brackish water 
project in influencing policy. It distinguishes these as factors that are internal and external to the 
project, and those that were within the control of the project, and those that were outside the 
control of the project. 
6.5.1 External Factors Affecting the Influence of the Project 
Within Syria and throughout the Middle East, there is wide recognition of the seriousness 
of water shortages.  The overall concern of this project, to manage demand of water through the 
use of lower quality water, falls within the broad priorities of the Syrian government.  What the 
project was unable to influence was the way in which the government approaches increasing 
water efficiency, through more efficient irrigation technologies. Another inhibiting factor was the 
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institutional context in which this project took place, and the circumscribed role that research 
plays.  In line with how Lindquist describes such “routine” decision-making regimes, Syrian 
decision-makers appear to be less receptive to research that recommends changes to existing 
policy.  It will be interesting to see if receptivity will increase as time moves forward and crises 
around water shortage deepen.  
It appears to be coincidental that Dr. Mona was appointed to minister after the completion 
of the project – in the sense that his appointment cannot be attributed to his work within the 
project.  His promotion was however an event which has contributed to the influence of this 
project in several ways.  First, his familiarity and involvement with issues surrounding the use of 
saline water in irrigation may have rendered him more receptive to research on the topic, and 
perhaps has allowed it to obtain more influence with him.  Dr. Mona’s promotion has brought 
other changes in personnel as well, and in a general way, this has had a wider influence on the 
policy regime within the ministry.  With his promotion, Dr. Mona has been implementing 
institutional reforms to elevate the stature of research within the Ministry.  He has also brought 
researchers into key positions in order to increase the ministry’s capacity to properly take 
research into account in decision-making.  Another aspect of this is that with their new 
appointments, these new researcher-officials bring their knowledge and networks with them, with 
the result that new ideas are in circulation around the MAAR.   According to the comments made 
by Dr. Oweis, and corroborated by interviews with policy makers, because of the project, the topic 
of irrigation with saline water is now a problem with which very highly placed policy makers are 
familiar. As research about how to safely use brackish water is elaborated, there are now 
intellectually receptive audiences for that research highly placed within the ministry. 
6.5.2 Internal Factors Affecting the Influence of the Project 
The involvement of ICARDA, with its high research capacity and strong reputation, was 
certainly one of the most important aspects of this project.  Firstly, ICARDA provided a stable 
platform for the project in terms of resources and logistical support.  Without its presence, it would 
have been unlikely to go ahead with the project.  Secondly, the stability of the staff and research 
programs at ICARDA provided storage capacity for the research results to be retained after the 
project closed, and a place from which those results could be carried forward into subsequent 
projects.  
The way in which the project was designed to bridge research and policy worlds through 
its participants was a strong element that increased its potential to influence policy.  The project 
deliberately brought individuals that were both researchers and decision-makers into its orbit.  
One example was the inclusion of Borhan Kasmo, whose PhD research was supported by the 
project, but who also works within the Ministry of Irrigation.  Another was the creation of the 
advisory committee, which included senior researchers from the university and officials and 
researchers from the government research stations.  Another aspect to this is that there appears 
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to be collaborative, informal networking between the researchers at government research 
institutions, the university, and at ICARDA.  With IDRC providing funds to elaborate this research 
topic amongst researchers across those institutions, the project has likely allowed issues 
surrounding saline water to gain some currency amongst that group.  With Dr. Mona’s promotion 
to Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, some of these researchers have come into 
prominent positions within the Ministry.  Others outside the ministry have been brought into closer 
orbit, which has likely done much to bring the subject into the view of policy and decision-makers. 
By far, the factor that most hindered the projects’ ability to realize greater influence (and 
also within its control) was its poor management and coordination.  The most obvious effect of 
this was that the project coordinator was unable to synthesize and present the findings of the 
project as a coherent whole.  This has severely limited the communicability of the results, and Dr. 
Oweis, Dr. Ahmed, and Dr. Brooks (in his PCR) all have all recommended that it would be worth 
devoting some additional resources to synthesise the project’s findings.  
The mismatched capacities of the University of Aleppo and ICARDA appears to have 
been a significant factor that contributed to the disappointing performance of the project.  
ICARDA is a research institution with modern research facilities and attracts experienced, 
international researchers.  In comparison, the institutional capacity at the University of Aleppo  
needs building  It has very little in the way of research facilities, and in comparison to ICARDA, 
has a poorly paid staff that is frequently turning over.   While there are risks presented to working 
with institutions of low capacity such as the University of Aleppo, the involvement of ICARDA 
presented an opportunity to increase those capacities.  It is within the mandate of ICARDA to 
build capacity in national systems, which includes the University of Aleppo (Oweis interview, 
October 20, 2002) and the project should have provided an excellent opportunity for the 
University-based professors and students to access those facilities, work with international caliber 
researchers, and gain some exposure to applied agricultural research.  Had appropriate 
provisions been made for close coordination and management, and had the research 
components designed so that they were within the ability of the professors and students to carry 
them out, the interaction could and should have been extremely positive.    
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7. FURTHER DISCUSSION 
In her review of the literature for theories of how research influences policy, Neilson 
(2001:44) points out that it has been theorists working exclusively in Western-democratic policy 
contexts have generated the literature on the influence of research on policy.  She states that the 
IDRC policy study offers an opportunity to flesh out some of these concepts with developing 
country perspectives, and poses a few provocative questions: 
So what kind of policy processes do these models represent for developing countries?  
What about those countries where non-state actors are not involved in the policy process 
because the state does not allow for them to?  What about one-party states or 
authoritarian states, or those states controlled by dictators?   
 
The final section of this case study addresses two concepts discussed in the literature 
review:  the concept of “policy communities” and the importance of “completeness of research”.  It 
is hoped that by discussing how these concepts appear in this case study.  It is also hoped that 
by addressing some of these more abstract concepts, the discussion will aid in finding similarities 
and differences across cases, further enabling IDRC’s policy study to generate understand about 
how useful these concepts are for examining developing country policy contexts. 
 
7.1 The concept of “Policy Communities” 
Lindquist suggests the policy community concept is useful for IDRC’s policy study, 
because of its flexibility in helping “to understand where power lies and the inter-relationships 
between government and non-government actors” (Lindquist, 2001:7).  Diane Stone defines 
policy communities as “stable networks of policy actors from both inside and outside government 
which are highly integrated with the policy making process” (Stone quoted in Neilson, 2001:24).  
Stone has also described how non-state actors such as journalists, think tank experts, and 
university researchers can achieve “insider status” to the community by adopting the normative 
characteristics of that community, chiefly “similar values, causal assumptions, and problem 
perceptions” (Stone 2002:3-4).   
The concept provides a useful perspective to describe the Syrian context, but due to   
limited information, it is extraordinarily difficult to map the actors on a map as Lindquist’s paper 
suggests. Affiliation with a particular government organization does not necessarily place and 
actor or group closer to the decision-making centre.  Actor’s connections through the party and 
other official institutions are also important.  
All major policy decisions emanate from the President. The main institution linking 
government with non-government actors is the Ba’th Party.  Policy is not usually subject to open 
debate by an “attentive public”.    Linkages between the government and non-government – such 
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as the party and workers associations - are not used to facilitate collaboration and exchange of 
information; influence generally flows outwards from the centre, not inwards (George 2003).   
There is little critical inquiry into policy.  The huge bureaucracy of government 
departments is one way that the influence of research is blunted.  Bureaucracy insulates official 
decisions made at the top from the bite of research from below.  New ideas and knowledge filter 
through the layers of different governmental departments and associated research arms.  The 
results of research carried out within government research stations are reported to the official in 
charge, who may or may not feed recommendations upwards through the system.  
Another way that critical inquiry is reduced is due to the profound influence that the 
government exerts on research and the role of universities.  The direction for research is pointed 
out by the national strategy.  Its leverage is increased due to the lack of resources for research at 
universities.  Since all research funding is subject to the approval of government, the national 
strategy functions as the lens that directs all research capacity onto national priorities. Another 
side of this is how higher education plays a political role in Syrian society. Teaching tends to rely 
heavily on rote learning as opposed to critical thinking and problem solving (George 2003; 
Holmwood 1988).  Education is seen as way of passing on accepted truths rather than promoting 
critical inquiry. 
In sum, in the centralized Syrian system, there is really only one central policy 
community, and it insulates itself from competing views through various means.  The overall 
effect is to create a system that amasses and stores knowledge but does not put it to use.  The 
danger of this is that it reduces the diversity of ideas in circulation - and because of increasing 
water shortages this may have serious consequences in the not-too-far-off future.  As Lindquist 
(2001:6) states, such a situation reduces the ability of the research system to supply “creative 
ideas for new policy approaches because they do not have a stake in the status quo”.   
 
7.2 “Completeness” of Research 
The fact that a ban on the use of runoff water was created suggests that new ideas can 
filter upwards and influence policy at a high level in Syria.  It was, however, not possible within 
this study to see the entire process by which this occurred.  From the vantage point of the 
researcher inside the system, the links between researchers and the decision-makers stretch out 
of view. Mapping the convoluted connections between the actors that linked Kasmo’s research to 
the specific policy change was not feasible in this case study.  This change occurred outside of 
the sphere of the project, was brought about within the Legislature, and influence occurred 
through actors working in the Ministry of Irrigation.  I was unable to identify any of the primary 
actors involved, much less gain access them.   
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It is important to point out that although IDRC-supported research was involved in the 
creation of a new regulation, this should not necessarily be regarded by IDRC as an 
accomplishment. The case study described another example of policy change regarding water 
and farming practices in Syria, and this concerned the sudden enforcement of the ban on growing 
cotton in dry areas.  Both bans illustrate policy actions on the part of the Syrian government that 
place restrictions on farmers.  In both cases, there is no indication that these changes were 
accompanied by in-depth analyses of costs and benefits, or an accounting of who the winners 
and losers of such policies might be.  
These aspects evoke Neilson’s (2001:40-41) concerns about the “completeness” and 
quality of research that is brought to bear on policy questions.  Quoting Seck and Phillips, Neilson 
explains that completeness, 
…relates to exploring all possible options and making available all relevant facts and 
figures that research can uncover on the search for intrinsically good policy options.  Its 
distinct characteristic is that it completes the information provided by the various groups 
of policy stakeholders in the attempt to make all relevant factors and considerations have 
a bearing on the outcome of the policy decision-making process (Seck and Phillips 
quoted in Neilson 2001: 40).  
 
Completeness and quality are relevant in this case because the research appears to 
have provided the parameters for regulations to a policy that could be used in ways to limit 
farmers.  It must be said that IDRC was not unaware of the lack of completeness - the project file 
contains many memos and emails that requested the researchers to include a wider range of 
disciplines in the overall research design as well as adjust the design of the experimental trials.  
Despite this urging, more social research was not included and experiments on the technical 
aspects remained wide-ranging and unfocused.  Due to these shortcomings, it appears that there 
were low expectations amongst project designers that policy influence could influence policy and 
decision-makers.  The project came to be understood more as building research capacity at the 
University of Aleppo than as influencing policy and policy makers (Rached interview, November 
23, 2002).   
Although the intent to influence policy was reduced over time, nothing to was done to re-
design project activities to fit with this new intent.  The connections between the project and 
government officials remained intact, and plans to invite officials and the media to the final 
workshop remained unchanged.  For the researchers part, it appears that there was never any 
expectation that their work could or should influence new policies.  Their concerns revolved 
around scientific aspects and their ability to complete their work.  Once the findings were written 
up and presented, they saw their role as completed. 
For IDRC, this issue of quality and completeness raises important questions about 
IDRC’s responsibility in the context of policy influence.  IDRC is founded on the notion that 
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knowledge creation is not an innocuous activity but carries with it an enormous potential for 
change – and this becomes very apparent in the context of policy influence.  What extent should 
IDRC make sure that all the relevant information is provided to policy makers?  Furthermore, 
when it is known that the supported work is exploratory, to what extent should IDRC go to make 
sure this is adequately communicated to policy makers who are receiving it? 
   
7.4 Final thoughts 
Given all the constraints and limitations, it does come as some surprise that the this 
project had some positive influences as well as stimulated one change in policy.  It is particularly 
noteworthy that it was not the overall performance of the project, its design, or the activities 
structured into the project that provided the impetus for the positive outcomes.  Despite consistent 
setbacks, the dogged energy of the individual researchers working towards their own goals in 
their own contexts provided the energy to keep things rolling.  It appears that this was no small 
feat, and the researchers should be congratulated for achieving what they did in what must have 
been a tremendously frustrating environment.  Perhaps further work to integrate and synthesize 
the completed components might reveal that more was achieved in project that is currently 
known.   
For the IDRC’s policy study, what these findings suggest is that high quality research and 
well-performing projects are not necessary requirements for influencing policy or for contributing 
to policy change.  They also suggest that success at influencing policy does not necessarily 
require successful, centrally engineered policy dialogue processes.  It was reported that the 
research results that informed new regulations were communicated through a conference at the 
Ministry of Irrigation – well outside of the sphere of the project.  It remains uncertain how the 
research actually contributed to that change.  For example, it may be the research actually 
inspired the creation of the new regulation.  It might also be the case that the research was 
consistent with changes that were already in motion, and were used as evidence supporting 
those changes.  Due to the restrictive and closed policy communities it seems unlikely that 
convincing research on its own would be sufficient to bring about changes on its own.   
What remains clear is that outsiders are often unable to understand the roles and 
responsibilities of the different organizations operating in Syria.  For Syrians, knowledge attained 
through personal networks appears to be important.   It takes time and immersion to become 
knowledgeable about how to operate within the system.  Information about the how’s and why’s 
underlying policy decisions are not clear, and the system does not make it easy for researchers 
who are keen on influencing policy.  Navigating the complicated web of constraints and 
opportunities requires in-depth insider knowledge, and outsiders such as IDRC staff are not 
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equipped to understand how to operate in this system, much less engineer strategies for policy 
influence.   
Due to these realities, and the way in which positive changes did came about, a few 
suggestions are offered about how IDRC might approach policy influence in challenging contexts 
such as the one Syria presents. First, policy influence may not be an appropriate goal in all 
projects – at least not without clearly articulating the types of influence that are being sought.  As 
Dr. Oweiss warned, citing policy as a target for research can limit what a project might otherwise 
achieve.  Second, the case study illustrates that imposing the goal of policy from the outside is 
not effective, which indicates that the operationalization of “policy influence” should be entirely the 
initiative of partners.  IDRC’s contribution would be to providing partners with the tools they 
require to carry out the work they wish.  The case study also indicates that “policy influence” 
should not be operationalized in projects through a checklist approach – such as requiring 
partners to include “dissemination workshops” or “policy dialogues” to satisfy IDRC requirements 
to close the loop with policy makers.  Particularly in different policy contexts like Syria, IDRC’s 
partners are best equipped to navigate the system.  It is partners that need to direct and be the 




                                                 
1 The term Strategic Evaluation denotes a category of study within IDRC’s evaluation system.  
Strategic evaluations are studies carried out under the initiative of the Evaluation Unit, and 
address issues that cut across IDRC programming units.  Strategic evaluations have a wider 
audience than Project, Program or Corporate evaluations, which tend to focus on topics that are 
relevant to narrower constituencies of users. 
 
2 Of Syria’s total external debt of USD 22 billion, IFAD (2001) reports that Russia claims about 
USD 10 billion, and East Germany about USD 1.0 billion.  Syria claims that these debts are no 
longer valid, as they were held by the Soviet Union and East Germany, both of which no longer 
exist. 
 
3 It is important to note the strength of the evidence supporting the facts of this story. The ban on 
growing cotton in arid areas is a policy measure undertaken to conserve water that was well 
known to all interviewees.  The story about the sudden change in enforcement was related to me 
by one researcher  during a casual and very informative conversation.  . That such a change had 
occurred was verified by Dr. Mona, when I asked him r to clarify how the ban on growing cotton 
had come into being and how it was enforced.  Dr. Mona did not address the change itself, but 
instead mentioned that extension services had improved at using the media to inform farmers 
about policies and the reasons behind them.  Although Dr. Mona’s comments did not expand on 
the reasons behind the change, his comments about extension services acknowledged that a 
change in the way the government has approached the policy had occurred - a strategy to 
provide better information to farmers in order to ameliorate the repercussions of punitive actions 
on their own.   
 
4 An implication of this is that such areas of policy inconsistency may indicate windows of 
opportunity where IDRC might support research to have some influence, either by supporting 
research addressing policies themselves, or by examining the sorts of adaptive strategies that are 
available to those whose livelihoods are affected.   
 
5 Most interviewees were able to identify the MAAR’s attempts to diffuse drip and sprinkler 
irrigation technologies as a very important initiative the Syrian government.  Laser-guided land-
leveling is another technology whose development has received outside donor support and also 
is receiving serious consideration for wider implementation.  The technology is promising 
because flood irrigation remains the most common technique used among farmers and land 
leveling can increase the efficiency of water use in flood irrigation by many times by reducing the 
amount of water lost by runoff.  The technology is very expensive however, and appears to be a 
secondary priority to the ministry. 
  
6 Syria’s water security is intimately tied to agreements with Turkey over sharing the water of the 
Euphrates River.  The Euphrates originates in Turkey, flows south into Syria and continues 
southeast through Syria eventually crossing the eastern border and enters Iraq.   
Jouejati (1996) has argued that Syria’s policy to invest in more efficient irrigation 
technologies are closely linked to its need to decrease its dependence on the Euphrates River. 
For Syria, the Euphrates is a critical resource and represents approximately 85% of the country’s 
available fresh water.  For Turkey, the Euphrates is seen as a source of great, untapped 
potential.  The Southeastern Anatolia Project (or “GAP” in the Turkish acronym) is a massive 
undertaking by Turkey to dam the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to further develop that potential.  
The dams are central to Turkish plans to create extensive irrigation canals to increase the 
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productivity of the southern part of the country, and to generate electricity to feed economic 
growth.  The absence of effective international rules to intervene and ensure adequate provision 
of water to all three countries has led heightened anxieties in Iraq and Syria about the future of 
their water supplies.   
 
7 For a detailed treatment of the role of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the way it 
shapes the web of relations between Israel and its other neighbours, see Brooks and Lonergan 
(1994). 
 
8 The absence of effective international rules and the ways in which water issues seep into 
existing territorial disputes significantly impedes the ability of nations to come to negotiated 
agreements for water sharing. Jouejati has described the environment as one in which countries 
are motivated by distrust of their neighbours, and take narrow self-interested positions resorting 
to pressure tactics that do not improve mutual goodwill: 
[G]iven the condition of anarchy in the international system, states are motivated by fear 
and mistrust, and their principle concern is with their security and survival.  In terms of 
interstate water disputes, central decision-makers choose less than optimal solutions in 
order to secure their own supplies (Jouejati, 1996:134).  
See Williams (2001) for other examples of how linkage between water and territorial 
issues has complicates peace negotiations.   
 
9 With interviews that were not taped, notes were taken.  In order to make sure the notes 
contained all the relevant information, immediately after each interview, I would go back over 
them while memory of the interview was still fresh to make sure that remembered details were 
included.  I stuck to the practice of revising notes immediately after the interview even with 
interviews that were recorded.  Initially, I did this as a way of reviewing what I had learned so far 
in preparation for the next interview.  I later discovered that this provided a means to assess the 
reliability of note taking on its own.  I discovered when I later reviewed notes in conjunction with 
audiotapes of an interview, I found that all of the informational content of the conversation was 
captured in notes - including all the important key words and phrases used the interviewee.  What 
was lost was the exact wording that respondents used.   
 
10 Although information that was gathered informally was a critical part of this study, it must be 
noted that no one has been quoted in this report that did not provide explicit consent to do so.   
 
11 This statement should not be taken as a definitive assessment on the treatment of gender in 
this thesis. The thesis is written in Arabic, but does include both an English and Arabic abstract. 
The above discussion of gender is based on what is presented in the English abstract; it is 
possible that more detailed and nuanced information is offered in the main text.  
 
12 Dr. Maya provided several statistics to describe the contributions of ICARDA to Syrian 
agricultural production. In 1977, Syrian wheat production amounted to 1.3 M tons per year and 
now it is 5M tons/year.  He also described that in 1977, rain fed wheat yields averaged 0.6 
tons/hectare, and is now 2.8 tons/hectare.  In irrigated agriculture, the improvement is even more 
pronounced:  yields have increased from 2.2 tonnes/hectare to 5.7 tonnes/hectare 
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ANNEX 1.  MAP OF SYRIA 
 
From Economist 2002 
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ANNEX 2.  SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS 
 
1.  INTERVIEWS 
Interviews 
 
Perspectives provided Location of 
interview 
Dr. David Brooks  
IDRC Senior Water Specialist 
Ottawa, Canada 






Dr. Georges Some  
Director,  
Department of Irrigation and Water Uses 
(DIWU), 
Duma, Syria 
(Oct. 19, 2002) 
 





Irrigation and Water 
Uses (DIWU) 
Duma, Syria 
Dr. Faisal Maya  
Director,  
Government Liaison Office 
ICARDA 
Tel Hadya, Syria 
(Oct. 20, 2002) 
 
Primarily Context ICARDA Tel Hadya, Syria 
Dr. Elizabeth Bailey  
Project Coordinator 
ICARDA  
Tel Hadya, Syria 





Tel Hadya, Syria 
 
Dr. Theib Oweis  
Senior Water Specialist,  
ICARDA 
Tel Hadya, Syria 
(Project Participant) 
(Oct. 20, 2002) 
 
Project Participant, Context 
 
ICARDA  
Tel Hadya, Syria 
Dr. Ahmed El-Ahmed  
Professor at University of Aleppo, 
Consultant to ICARDA 
Tel Hadya, Syria 
(Oct. 20, 2002) 
 
Project Participant, Context 
 
ICARDA  
Tel Hadya, Syria 
Dr. Nabil Trabulsi 
Government Liaison 
ICARDA 
Tel Hadya, Syria 




Tel Hadya, Syria 
 
Dr. Adriana Bruggeman  
Agricultural Hydrology Specialist 
ICARDA 
Tel Hadya, Syria 
(Oct. 20, 2002) 
 





Perspectives provided Location of 
interview 
Dr. Majid Jamal 
Director General,  
General Commission for Scientific 
Agricultural Research (GCSAR) 
Damascus, Syria 







Dr. Noureddin Mona 
Former Professor of Socio-Economics at 
University of Aleppo 
Currently Minister of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Reform 
Damascus, Syria  
(Oct. 23, 2002) 
 







Dr. Robert Bonnell  
Professor of Agricultural Engineering,  
McGill University 
Montreal, Canada 





St. Anne de 
Bellevue Campus, 
Montreal, Canada 
Dr. Eglal Rached  
IDRC Regional Director, MERO 
Cairo, Egypt 
(Nov. 21, 2002) 
 
IDRC Program Officer 
responsible for the project, 
IDRC  
Ottawa, Canada 
Dr. Michel Wakil 
Independent Consultant 
(Jan. 15 and 16, 2002) 
Project Coordinator Telephone (Ottawa-Montreal) 
 
2.  MEETINGS WITH GROUPS 





Eng. Nidal Al Jouni (translator) 
Eng. Mazem Doughouz 
Eng. Mohamed Hakoun 
Eng. Hisham Barakat 
Eng. Hashem Akeed 
Eng. Abeer Khatib 
Eng. Rabea Hayek 
Eng. Mizar Saad 
DIWU Research Station 








Dr. Ahmed Al Ahmed (translator) 
Dr. Adib Rahme (Current Dean) 
Dr. Abdul Naser Aldirir 
Dr. Haleb Koteb 
Borhan Kasmo, PhD candidate 
Hamida Zibdieh, MSc 
Aziza Al Attia, MSc 
Amira Al Saleh, MSc 











• Thank you for agreeing to meet 
• Introduce myself  
• Here to talk about project: ---------------------------------------  
• Purpose of the study on the influence of IDRC-supported research on  public policy : 
o Help IDRC better understand what is meant by public policy influence and the 
factors that help/hinder it occurring from the perspective of an org. that supports 
research  
• Evaluation is made up of a number of sub-components: 
o Reviews of existing documents (e.g. literature, evaluations, PCRs) 
o Approx. 30 project case-studies worldwide in the 3 programming areas in which 
IDRC supports research:  ICT4D, ENRM, & SEE  
o WDM in the middle east is one of the case-studies where we are trying to tell the 
story of the influence of the research 
• Intended use of the study: 
o improve project design and implementation in order to increase policy influence 
where  it is a stated objective  
• Give copy of briefing note 




• Ideally tape the interview & write notes so we can go back over following the interview  
• Do you agree with us taping the interview? 
• Are you willing to be quoted in the report or would you prefer to be kept anonymous? 
• We will provide you with a copy of a draft report to review & comment on to make sure 
we accurately portray your opinions. 
• Interview steps:   
o 1st – ask you some questions about the broader context of water demand 
management in the middle east  
o 2nd -- ask you about what has happened since the project was completed 
o 3rd  – ask you about what led to this project being developed 
o 4th – ask you about what happened during the project 
• Please stop me at any time if you have questions, want clarification or don`t want to 
answer a question 
• Amount of time: It will take about 1 ½-2 hours per project.  Is that ok?  
 
[IF NOT ENOUGH TIME, RESCHEDULE INTERVIEW] 





These questions are to help us better understand your perspective on the topic of 
water demand management and the link between research and policy in [country].   
They`re not specifically about the project.  Although it is a complex topic on which 
books have been written, we`d like to spend a few minutes getting at the most salient 
issues as you perceive them. 
 
1) In your opinion, what are the major issues surrounding water in 
[country]?  How are they being addressed at a policy level? 
 
2) In your opinion, who are the major players involved in making 
public policy for water management in [country]? 
 
3) How would you characterize the relationship between research 








What happened after the project? 
 
It`s sometimes easier to think about the present so we`re going to start with 
questions related to the outcomes of the project since it was completed in 
19--.  In particular I`m going to ask you about the people who were involved 
with the project and what has been done with the research results… 
 
a) Since the project was completed, what has happened with  those who were 
involved?  
 
(Probe – Where are the researchers/policy makers who were involved?  What are 
they doing?) 
 
(b) What happened with the research findings?  
 
(c) Have any dissemination activities continued?  What? How? 
 
(d) Who would you say has used the research?  How have they used the research?  
Are they doing something differently than before?   
 
(Probe:  How did the project contribute to these changes?  What else contributed to 
these changes?) 
 
(Gender probe – did men and women use the research differently? How? How 
would you describe this difference?  If no, should it have been? Why? Why not?) 
 
(e) How did the project contribute to these changes?  What else contributed to these 
changes? 
   
(f) Generally, how would you say this project contributed to public policy in [country] 
specifically or in the middle east more broadly?   
 
(Probe -- Did it contribute to better water management in [country] or the middle east 
more broadly?  What kind?) 
 




II. What led to the project? 
 
Thinking back to when you first got involved with this project…. 
 
(a) How did you get involved? 
 
(b) What was your role? 
 
(c) In your view, who were the key players at this early stage of the project? Why do 
you think they were key? What was their role? 
 
(Gender probe – how did they participate?  How was each specifically involved in 
this early stage of the project?   
 
(d) What issue or problem were you trying to address through this project?  
 
(Gender probe –  was gender considered?  In what way? What were the major 
issues relating to men and women and their roles and relationships in society, that 
the project wanted to address?  
IF NOT-- Looking back now, is there something that should have been done to better 
integrate gender considerations at this early stage?) 
 
(e) Did those involved with the project discuss policy influence from the outset?  
Was it incorporated into the project design?  How?  
 
 




III. What happened during the project? 
 
I`d now ask you to think about the period in which the project was actually being 
implemented… 
 
(a) When it started, what did the project intend to achieve?  Did this change over the 
course of the project`s implementation? 
 
(Probes from project documentation) 
 
(b) What actually happened?   
 
(Probe:  What would you say this project achieved?  What were its failings?  Were 
there any unexpected outcomes? (positive or negative)) 
 
(c) All in all, do you feel the project`s objectives in terms of public policy were met?  
Why or why not? 
 
(d) How would you describe the approach to influencing public policy in this project? 
 
(e) What dissemination strategies were used?  How effective were they? 
 
(Gender probe – were different dissemination strategies used for reaching different 
groups?  What kinds? For whom? Why/ why not? Were they appropriate?) 
 
(f) How would you describe the environment in which this project took place?   
 
(Probe: Were there any major changes that affected the project?  What were they?  
What was their influence on the project and the results it was trying to achieve?) 
 
(g) What constraints or barriers were faced?  How were they dealt with?  What was 
their effect on the project? 
 
(Probe:  political, legislative, economic, technical, social) 
 
 
(h) Who was influenced by the research process or research findings?  How? In 
what ways? 
 
(Probe about those inside the policy process (e.g. either decision makers in charge 
of policy decisions or those in the front line of policy recommendations or 
development). Who specifically? In what way? What was their role?)) 
 
(Probe about the influence on those outside the policy process (e.g. those who 
directly or indirectly try to influence policy makers or the policy process --- advocacy 
groups or lobbyists) – was there any influence on them? What kind 
  
(i) What was it particularly about the research process or research findings that 
allowed this influence? 
 
(j) Did anything else help bring about this influence on [-----]? 
 
 





We`ve been speaking about this project in particular, but could you please 
comment on the role you think IDRC has played more broadly in 
influencing water demand management policy in [country]. 
 
IDRC is looking to improve from the information gathered in this evaluation, in 
this vein, do you have any suggestions on ways it could improve the way 




Is there anyone you would suggest we interview in order to get a better 
understanding of how this project influenced public policy? 
 
Are there any documents you would suggest we should look at? 
 




Thank you very much for your time and attention during this interview. 
 
Confirm on direct quoting 
 
Would you like to review a draft report when it is completed at the end of 
November? 
 
Would you like to receive a copy of the final report when it is completed? 
 





Types of Policy Influence -  
 
1. Expanding policy capacities 
 
 Improving the knowledge / data of certain actors 
 Supporting recipients to develop innovative ideas 
 Improving capabilities to communicate ideas 
 Developing new talent for research and analysis 
 
 
2. Broadening policy horizons 
 
 Providing opportunities for networking / learning within the jurisdiction or with colleagues 
elsewhere 
 Introducing new concepts to frame debates, putting ideas on the agenda, or stimulating 
public debate 
 Educating researchers and others who take up new positions with broader understanding of 
issues 
 Stimulating quiet dialogue among decision makers and among or with researchers 
 
 
3. Affecting policy regimes 
 
 Modification of existing programs or policies 





Gender dimensions run throughout the questions.  Key prompts need to be added so that the 
interviewer can provide an assessment on each of the points below as to the degree of incorporation 
of gender sensitive analysis. 
 
Was analysis gender sensitive or gender neutral in the policy influence process in the following 
domains (indicate evidence): 
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